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TAX DEDUCTIONS AS PERMISSIBLE STATE AID TO
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
Mueller v. Allen
103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983)
HUGH F. SMART*
With the approach of the 1984 Presidential elections, the debate
over the relationship between religion and education has increased
sharply.' The advocates of permitting prayer in public schools and
providing aid to parochial schools have found a champion in President
Reagan. These policies are being promoted as a response to the per-
ceived desire of many Americans to return to more traditional social
and educational values and to promote freedom of choice in education.
Opposed to these policies are those who adhere to the traditional con-
stitutional view which separates the church and state and others who
believe that it is the state public school system which provides the best
opportunity for a well-educated populace.
The issue of aid to parochial schools is not new, however. In re-
cent years state legislators have frequently taken steps to promote aid
to parochial schools in response to the increasing financial pressures
experienced by these schools and the concern that if these schools close,
the state will have to bear an enormous cost in educating the children.
2
Generally, state aid packages have included one or more of the follow-
ing features: direct aid to parents in the form of textbook loans or
B.A. (1975), M.A. (1979), Cambridge University, England; M.A. (1977), Sheffield Univer-
sity, England; Candidate for J.D., liT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1985.
1. In the early days of the 1984 Presidential campaign, the issue of church and state has
dominated the debate. See Time, September 10, 1984, cover story; Wall Street Journal, September
18, 1984, § I at 1, col. 1. The arguments over the separation of church and state have largely
arisen over the questions of prayer in public schools, tax benefits to parochial schools and abor-
tion. President Reagan's views are strongly supported by the Moral Majority and other Christian
Fundamentalist groups. Opposed to the President's view are many Protestant and other churches
and Jewish organizations such as B'nai B'Rith. See, e.g., Time, September 17, 1984, at 26, col. 1.
2. The initial impetus for such programs was Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
which suggested that broadly based aid schemes would be constitutional. The Court emphasized
that "religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education" and indi-
cated that aid to the schools' secular education was permissible. Id. at 245, 247-48. After Allen
there was considerable legislative pressure to provide aid to nonpublic schools but this was largely
thwarted by the Supreme Court. See, Wilson, The School Aid Decisions: A Chronicle of Dashed
Expectations, 3 J. LAw & EDUC. 101, 102 (1974). After Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983)
there has been similar pressure to provide aid through the tax system. Gallagher, Tuition Tax
Breaks on Docket, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 8, 1984, § I at 3, col. 1.
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transportation expense reimbursement; 3 direct aid to private schools
through the provision of instructional materials or reimbursement for
testing programs;4 or indirect aid in the form of tax deductions or cred-
its for tuition and other expenses. 5 All of these programs have been
challenged as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, which requires that the state shall not establish a religion.6 Some
programs have been upheld, although the majority have been struck
down.
7
The Supreme Court has considered these aid packages on several
occasions but the parameters of what constitutes acceptable aid are far
from clear. The Court has developed a three-part test for use in estab-
lishment clause cases 8 which provides that a statute does not violate the
establishment clause if: it has a valid secular purpose; the primary ef-
fect is neither to advance nor hinder religion; and it does not exces-
sively entangle the state in the affairs of religion. Despite the existence
of the test, its application has not provided the certainty and guidance
to the states that it might suggest. The application of the test has been
uneven as the Court has differed over the weight to be accorded the
sections. As a result of the confusion, many states have found their
programs subject to review under very different standards from when
they were enacted. 9 In many such cases, the statutes had been enacted
in accordance with the latest Supreme Court decision.
Mueller v. Allen'0 presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court
to provide clear and adequate guidelines for the states. In Mueller,
Minnesota enacted a statute which allowed a deduction when comput-
ing state income tax liability for tuition, textbooks and transportation
expenses incurred by the parents of all schoolchildren." The statute
3. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loan); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation expenses).
4. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (instructional materials); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (testing programs).
5. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Mueller v.
Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,..." U.S. CONST. amend I. The first amendment is made applicable to the
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 108 (1943).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 17-75.
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1971).
9. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 607 (1971), Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) and
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) all involved Pennsylvania statutes.
10. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
1I. Section 290.09(22) provides the following deduction from gross income in computing net
income:
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was challenged by taxpayers as violating the establishment clause' 2 be-
cause the main beneficiaries of the deduction would be the parents of
parochial schoolchildren and the statute, therefore, was a state subsidy
for sending children to religious schools. In upholding the statute, the
Supreme Court significantly altered the existing three-part test thereby
widening the scope of permissible aid. In doing so, the Court stressed
that the statute provided benefits to parents of both public and private
schoolchildren and that the benefit from this type of tax relief was far
removed from the types of involvement envisaged by the original sup-
porters of the establishment clause.
This comment will examine the background to the establishment
clause as it has been applied in the area of state aid to private elemen-
tary and secondary schools.' 3 It will then present the reasoning of the
Mueller Court and analyze that decision. The analysis will indicate
that the Court has adopted a position which disregards the concerns of
the establishment clause. By stressing the wide reach of the statute be-
cause of its application to both public and nonpublic schools, the Court
has relied on a factor which had not previously been considered rele-
vant. Prior decisions had confined their analysis to the impact of the
legislation on private sectarian schools. For the first time, the Court
regarded the role played by private schools in society as a sufficient
justification for state aid to the schools. In upholding such broadly
based aid, the Court has eliminated the requirement that aid be re-
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12,
for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary
or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wis-
consin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attend-
ance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall
mean and include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in ele-
mentary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly
taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include
instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or
worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall
it include such books or materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities in-
cluding sporting events, musical or dramatic events, speech activities, driver's education,
or programs of a similar nature.
MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982).
12. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981), aft'd676 F. 2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982).
13. This comment will consider only aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools. In
considering aid to sectarian higher education facilities the Court has adopted less stringent stan-
dards. Unlike primary schools, religious indoctrination is not a principal purpose of higher edu-
cation facilities. Also, the age of the students and the nature of college courses limit opportunities
for sectarian influence. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971). See also Roemer v. Board
of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development. Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968).
[Hereinafter referred to as Giannella].
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stricted to the secular activities of the private schools. Consequently,
state aid is now permissible to advance the sectarian functions of reli-
gious schools, a clear violation of the first amendment as previously
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion are contained
in the first amendment. The establishment clause of the first amend-
ment provides that the government will not establish a religion. The
free exercise clause provides that a person's free exercise of religion will
not be infringed.1 4 The clauses are intended to protect the autonomy of
religious belief and conduct and to ensure the separation of church and
state. 15
These goals of the first amendment are implemented through the
policies of voluntarism and neutrality.' 6 Voluntarism requires that
religious bodies survive and prosper on their own merits, as a result of
their own endeavors and support of their members, and not as a result
of state patronage. Neutrality requires that the state should not prefer
one religious sect over another, nor religion over nonreligion, and that
it should take no action to deter religious belief.
The first Supreme Court case to apply the establishment clause to
the states through the fourteenth amendment was Everson v. Board of
Education.17 In Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey program
which reimbursed parents for transportation expenses involved in send-
ing their children to public and certain Catholic schools. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, extensively reviewed the historical background
of the establishment clause and concluded that a "wall of separation"
between church and state was mandated by history and experience.' 8
Although the legislation provided some benefit to the Catholic schools,
it was upheld because the Court found it to be a general welfare pro-
gram designed to help parents get their children to and from school
safely. Transportation was considered to be clearly separate from the
religious functions of the schools and if the aid was denied it would be
more difficult for the schools to operate. By hindering the operation of
these schools, the state would effectively be acting adversely to the reli-
14. For the text of the first amendment see supra note 6.
15. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
16. See L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3 818-19 (1978). [Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Tribe]. Gianella, supra note 13, at 516-22.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. Id at 16-18.
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gious schools and contrary to the policy of neutrality.' 9
Justice Rutledge, in dissent, wrote an extensive historical analysis
of the establishment clause; an analysis which has largely been unchal-
lenged in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Although he reached
the same historical conclusion as the majority-that a wall of separa-
tion was required-he differed sharply over the application of the con-
clusion to the facts. In a strict application of the separation of church
and state doctrine, he concluded that transportation was an essential
part of the cost of education and that state reimbursement of any part
of religious education was impermissible. 20
For 21 years after Everson, the Supreme Court did not consider the
issue of aid to parochial schools. It did, however, consider several cases
involving the establishment clause and religious exercises in public
schools. These cases included such issues as religious instruction,2'
school prayer22 and bible reading.23 The Supreme Court adopted a
policy of benevolent neutrality, recognizing that total separation of
church and state was not constitutionally required, nor was it realis-
tic. 24 The Court stressed the requirement of neutrality in relations be-
tween the state and religious organizations and, in particular, that no
state funds could be used to further religious aims.25
It was against this background of non-parochial school religious
cases that the Supreme Court developed the three-part establishment
clause test that it has applied in analyzing sectarian school aid cases.
The first two elements were drawn from Abington School District v.
Schempp.26 In Schempp, a Pennsylvania statute required that the pub-
lic school day start with the reading of verses from the Bible and the
unison recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students. By requiring
such religious exercises, the Court held that the state was aiding reli-
gion. In doing so, the Court found that for a statute to survive scrutiny
under the establishment clause, it must meet a two-part test: (1) the
19. Id.
20. 330 U.S. at 28. Justice Rutledge's dissent was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson
and Burton. Justice Jackson also wrote separately. 330 U.S. at 18. Justice Rutledge's strict appli-
cation of the separation doctrine is now being advocated by Justice Stevens. See Comm. for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
22. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
23. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
24. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The Court stated "[wle are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id.
25. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Abington School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
26. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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legislation must have a secular purpose; and (2) its primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion.
27
The third element was added in Walz v. Tax Commission.28 Walz
involved a challenge by a New York taxpayer to a New York statute
which permitted property tax exemptions for religious organizations.
The Court examined the relationship between the religious organiza-
tion and the state to ensure that there was no "excessive government
entanglement with religion. ' 29 Balancing the state involvement, the
Court found that there was no excessive entanglement in upholding the
exemption. The Court noted that if the tax exempt status were denied,
the role of the state would expand for it would become involved in tax
valuation of church property, tax liens and other tax assessment and
collection procedures.
30
The three elements were drawn together in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3'
The Lemon Court held that a provision will avoid impermissible state
involvement in religion if: it has a legitimate secular purpose; it does
not have the primary effect of advancing or hindering religion; and it
does not lead to excessive entanglement by the state in the affairs of
religion.32 Subsequent cases focused on different aspects of the Lemon
test with considerable disagreement over the meaning of the various
elements of the test. The three elements of the test will be analyzed
separately.
THE SECULAR PURPOSE REQUIREMENT
The first requirement is that the legislation must have a valid secu-
lar purpose. Unlike the other two parts of the Lemon test, the Court
has been willing to defer to the judgment of the legislature in determin-
ing whether a statute has a secular purpose.33 In the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, the Court will presume that the legislation in
question had a secular purpose. Thus, purposes such as the furtherance
of educational opportunities for the young34 or the state concern for
27. Id. at 222.
28. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
29. Id. at 674.
30. Id.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. Id at 612-13.
33. Eg., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). The Court stated "the statutes them-
selves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all
schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures
meant anything else."
34. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
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maintaining minimum standards in schools operated in the state 35 have
been upheld even if the statute has subsequently been struck down on
the basis of one of the other parts of the Lemon test. In many cases,
there has been no express legislative statement of purpose relating to
the challenged section and no legislative history. Nevertheless, the
Court has been willing to find a valid purpose if it was plausible from
the statute's face. Usually this part of the test has been quickly dis-
posed of and in no recent establishment clause case involving aid to
religious schools has it been determinative.
36
THE PRIMARY EFFECT INQUIRY
Of the three parts of the Lemon test, the requirement that the stat-
ute must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion
has caused the most difficulty. Unlike the "secular purpose" require-
ment, the Supreme Court will not defer to legislative judgment as to the
effect of the statute. In the early cases, the Court considered such fac-
tors as whether parents or schools were the primary beneficiaries,
37
whether the aid was direct or indirect, 38 and whether the aid was di-
rected to both public and nonpublic schools or only to nonpublic
schools. 39 Subsequently, the emphasis has shifted more towards a con-
sideration of whether the state or the school controlled the program.
40
In the first case to consider the primary effect in the context of
religious schools, Board of Education v. Allen,4 1 the Court stressed the
fact that the financial beneficiaries of the program were the parents of
both public and nonpublic schoolchildren and that the program was
restricted to the secular education programs. 42 A New York statute
provided for textbook loans to students at both private and public
schools. The textbooks were restricted to secular subjects and were lent
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
36. In an establishment clause case not involving aid to schools, the Court accepted that the
law as a whole had a valid secular purpose but found that the provision in question did not.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 248, 254-55 (1982). The provision in question exempted from
certain registration and reporting requirements religious organizations which received more than
50% of their contributions from their members. The provision appeared to be directed solely at
the Unification Church.
37. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 244 (1968).
38. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-76
(1973).
39. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968).
40. See, e.g., Wolrnan v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
41. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
42. Id. at 243-45.
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to the parents rather than the schools. Although books were considered
to be a much more integral part of education than the transportation
expenses reimbursed in Everson, there was no violation of the establish-
ment clause because the Court concluded that the secular and religious
education functions of sectarian schools could be separated. As long as
aid was restricted to secular programs, it was permissible.
43
In 1973, in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,44 the Court used the primary effect inquiry to strike down an-
other New York statute.45 The New York statute provided both direct
aid to the private schools in the form of maintenance and repair grants
and indirect aid in the form of tuition reimbursement and tax deduc-
tions for parents. The Court found that any direct aid which was not
restricted to secular purposes was forbidden as it operated as a direct
subsidy for religious activities.46 Similarly, indirect aid which was not
restricted to secular purposes acted as a subsidy and was forbidden.47
The fact that the indirect aid would benefit parents rather than the
schools was not sufficient to overcome its impermissible effect. Fur-
thermore, the Court rejected the argument that it was required to dis-
tinguish between primary and secondary effects of the questioned
programs and concluded that any law which has the "direct and imme-
diate effect of advancing religion" should be struck down under this
inquiry.
48
In Meek v. Pittenger,49 a divided Court struck down part of a
43. Id. Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in Everson, dissented strongly, stating
that the New York law was a "flat, flagrant and open violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 250. (Black, J., dissenting). He argued that books, unlike transportation, go
to the heart of the educational process and are inevitably used to disseminate the views of the sect.
Justice Douglas also dissented, stressing the inevitable conflicts which he felt were likely to
arise as sectarian schools sought to have their choice of sectarian based books approved by local
school boards. Despite the law's apparent neutrality, the realistic effect was that it would be used
to supply sectarian books for sectarian schools. Id. at 256. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
45. Between 1968 and 1973 the cases had been heavily influenced by the excessive entangle-
ment test as set forth in Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
46. 413 U.S. at 774.
47. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks limited to texts suitable for
use in state schools); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation not related to
religious aims of school).
48. 413 U.S. at 783-84 n.39. Justice Rehnquist dissented from the striking down of the tax
deduction and tuition reimbursement provisions. Id. at 805. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
He noted the similarity between the tax deduction provision and other fixed amount federal tax
deductions and disagreed that the effect was necessarily to encourage parents to send their chil-
dren to private schools. Furthermore, he considered that the statute could be upheld under the
concept of "benevolent neutrality" as all the state was doing was equalizing the cost of education
between public and private schools. 413 U.S. at 810.
49. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Meek was a plurality decision with the Court divided into three
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Pennsylvania statute which allowed the state to lend instructional
materials and equipment 5° directly to nonpublic schools. The primary
effect of the statute was to advance religion as 75% of Pennsylvania's
nonpublic schools were church related or religiously affiliated, 51 and
the aid was direct and substantial in amount.5 2 In a reversal of its ear-
lier position, established in Allen, the Court found that religious educa-
tion was so pervasive in sectarian schools that aid, even if ostensibly
limited to secular programs, would inevitably support the religious mis-
sion of the schools. 53 Rather than overrule Allen, the textbook loan
program was upheld as it was constitutionally indistinguishable from
the program in Allen. In this case, however, the financial beneficiaries
were the parents rather than the schools.
54
Two years later, in 1977, a much more divided Court decided Wol-
man v. Walter.5 In Wolman, the Ohio legislature had enacted an aid
package after the decision in Meek and had attempted to conform its
new legislation to meet the standard enunciated in that decision. A
variety of programs, including standardized testing services and diag-
nostic and therapeutic services for students, were upheld. In approving
these programs, the Court found that the school had no control over
blocks of three. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion which was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Powell. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas joined the parts of the decision striking down the
loan of instructional materials and the provision of auxiliary services. Justices Rehnquist, White
and the Chief Justice joined the decision in upholding the textbook loan provision.
50. 421 U.S. at 365. The materials and equipment included such items as periodicals, maps,
charts and projection, recording and laboratory equipment. The Court recognized that most of
the instructional materials were serf-policing, non-ideological and neutral. However, because of
the all-pervading religious mission of parochial schools, the aid necessarily results in the direct
and substantial advancement of religion. Id. at 366.
5 1. Id. at 364. The use of the percentage of religious schools in the benefited class was
sharply criticized by Justice Rehnquist because of the lack of consistency in its application. While
the percentage was found to be significant for the purposes of the instructional material program,
it was not considered significant for the purposes of the textbook loan provision which was part of
the same Act. Id. at 388-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
52. 421 U.S. at 365.
53. Id at 365-66.
54. 421 U.S. at 361 (Opinion of Stewart, J.). Justice Stewart considered the fact that one
statute was used in Allen and two in Meek to provide textbooks to both public and nonpublic
schoolchildren to be insignificant. 421 U.S. at 360 n.8.
55. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart and Powell. Justices Rehnquist and White joined in upholding the textbook,
testing and scoring, diagnostic and therapeutic services provisions. Justice Brennan joined in
striking down the instructional materials and field trip transportation provisions. Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens joined in upholding the diagnostic services provision and in striking down the
instructional materials and field trip provisions. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist and
White dissented from the decision to strike down the instructional materials and field trip trans-
portation provisions. Justice Powell's opinion is evidence of a significant change of position. He
is now much more receptive to programs to aid private schools and much less concerned with the
historical background of the establishment clause. This shift in position has formed the basis of
the subsequent majority decisions in school aid cases.
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the substance of the testing services; the diagnostic services were part of
public welfare services which had no educational content; and the ther-
apeutic services were outside the control of the sectarian schools be-
cause they were to be provided on neutral sites by public school
personnel.5 6 However, the programs to provide instructional materials
and transportation expenses for field trips were struck down under the
primary effect inquiry.
The instructional materials provision was struck down for the
same reasons as the program in Meek. Ohio had sought to avoid the
result in Meek by providing that the equipment and materials would be
loaned to the parents rather than the school. The Court rejected this as
a mere technicality and found that the primary effect was to advance
religious teaching.57 Once again, the Court stressed that it was impossi-
ble to separate the religious and secular functions of sectarian schools,
so that all instructional materials could be diverted to religious uses.58
The field trip transportation provision also failed under the pri-
mary effect inquiry. 59 Although the provision paralleled a similar pro-
vision for public schools, the Court found that private school staff had
control over the timing and selection of the trips, and that such trips
could be used for sectarian rather than secular purposes. With the
amount of control exercised by the schools, it was the schools rather
than the children who received the benefit from such a provision.60
In 1980, a New York statute providing for direct cash reimburse-
ments to parochial schools for performing various state mandated test-
ing and reporting services was upheld in Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan.6' The testing services were
characterized as being similar to those upheld in Wolman v. Walter.62
56. 433 U.S. at 238-48.
57. "Despite the technical change in legal bailee, the program in substance is the same as
before: The equipment is substantially the same; it will receive the same use by the students; and
it may still be stored and distributed on the nonpublic school premises." 433 U.S. at 250.
58. The Court recognized that its finding that the secular and religious functions could not be
separated caused tension with Allen which had found the functions to be separable. Allen was
followed as a matter of stare decisis, although it probably should have been overruled. Id. at 25 I
n. 18. For a discussion of whether the secular and religious aspects of education can be separated
see Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1689-91 (1968).
59. 433 U.S. at 252-55.
60. Id. at 252-54. The Court also noted that it is the teacher who would make the field trip
meaningful and as the teacher works within a sectarian institution, there is an unacceptable risk of
fostering religion on such trips. Id.
61. 444 U.S. 646 (1980). The majority consisted of the Chief Justice, Justices Stewart, Powell,
Rehnquist and White.
62. Id. at 654. In Wolman, the tests were prepared by the state and graded by public school
personnel. In Regan, three types of tests were involved, only one of which was graded by the
State, the others were graded by nonpublic school personnel. Because of the objective nature of
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Following the reasoning in Wolman, the primary effect was found not
to advance religion because the schools had no control over the exami-
nations or the grading. Moreover, the fact that the reimbursement was
in the form of a direct cash payment was considered of no consequence
once the secular purpose and primary effect inquiries were satisfied.
63
In the years between the Allen and Regan decisions there have
been two major shifts in the thinking of the Supreme Court on the pri-
mary effect inquiry. First, the Court has rejected the initial Allen posi-
tion that the secular and educational functions of sectarian schools
could be separated. Second, the Regan Court now appears to be will-
ing to permit direct aid to sectarian schools if the primary effect of the
program is not to advance religion. Prior Supreme Court decisions had
considered that direct aid inevitably advanced the religious mission of
the schools regardless of whether the program was restricted to secular
purposes or not.64 Overall, the more recent cases have stressed the is-
sue of who has control over implementation of the program: if the
school has control, the program is likely to be impermissible; if the
state, through public school personnel, has control then it will probably
be upheld.
THE EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT INQUIRY
Under the third part of the Lemon test, the Court is seeking to
avoid excessive entanglement by the state in the affairs of religious or-
ganizations. The Court has considered two different types of entangle-
ment, administrative and political. Administrative entanglement may
occur when the state is involved in administering an aid program which
results in supervising or regulating the affairs of a religious organiza-
tion.65  Political entanglement or "divisive political potential" 66 may
arise when religion becomes involved in politics and the affairs of state,
usually to ensure the continued existence or expansion of an aid pro-
the testing, the Court found that the differences between the two schemes to be insignificant.
Compare Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (New York
provision to provide aid for teacher prepared tests was denied).
63. 444 at 657-58. Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that direct aid to religious schools of
any type was prohibited and that this had been firmly established in Wolman and prior cases. Id.
at 666-67. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Without a specific accounting to ensure that the money was
not used for sectarian purposes, the primary effect of the provision was to advance religion. Part
of the money was used to enforce attendance requirements which were required by the state and
the schools themselves. Unless the money was restricted to enforcing state requirements for at-
tendance, the aid impermissibly benefited the religious function of the school.
64. E.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795-98.
65. Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
66. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
gram. 67 Some decisions have not distinguished between the adminis-
trative and political elements, while Justice Brennan has suggested that
political entanglement inquiry should be a fourth part of the establish-
ment clause test.68
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,69 the administrative entanglement part of
the test was used to strike down two separate private school aid pro-
grams which were consolidated on appeal. Rhode Island provided sal-
ary supplements for teachers who taught only secular subjects and
Pennsylvania reimbursed the schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks
and materials used in teaching certain secular subjects. 70  The Court
held that both programs involved excessive entanglement between the
state and the nonpublic schools because the statutes required states to
continuously supervise the programs to ensure that the religious
schools followed the restrictions imposed. In determining whether a
program involved excessive entanglement with religion, the factors to
be considered are "the character and purpose of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the result-
ing relationship between the government and the religious authority.
'
"71
In Meek v. Pittenger,72 Pennsylvania had attempted to correct the
problems of the private school aid package struck down in Lemon.
67. Id. In Lemon, Justice Burger considered this inquiry to be part of the broader concern
about entanglement. His concern was that the need for annual appropriations would lead to polit-
ical divisiveness. A similar concern was expressed by the majority in Meek about the auxiliary
services program and its need for annual appropriations. For the first year the appropriation was
over $14 million for all schemes except instructional materials and equipment and textbooks. In
the second year the appropriation increased to $17,880,000. 421 U.S. at 369 n. 19. Although the
Court did not need to examine the entanglement question in Nyquist, it did issue warnings about
the divisive nature of the provisions, including the tax deduction provision which did not require
annual reassessment. 413 U.S. at 794-97.
68. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). While concurring with the majority in Meek as to the divisive political potential of
the auxiliary services program, Justice Brennan found that this element was sufficient to hold the
other elements of the scheme unconstitutional. The textbook programs should have been invali-
dated because of the size of the appropriations involved ($4,670,000 in 1972-73) and Allen should
have been overruled as it did consider the divisive political potential of the scheme. Id. at 377-79.
Similarly, in his opinion in Wolman, he dissented from the parts of the decision which upheld
parts of the scheme because the Court did not consider the divisive political potential caused by
the aid schemes and because of the amount of aid involved. For the first two years $88,000,000
had been appropriated. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977).
69. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70. The Rhode Island statute provided for a 15% salary supplement for teachers at nonpublic
schools where expenditure per pupil was less than the average expenditure at public schools. The
aid was restricted to teachers teaching only courses available in public schools and they had to
agree not to teach courses in religion. The Pennsylvania statute authorized the Superintendent of
Public Instruction to purchase certain secular educational services from nonpublic schools, di-
rectly reimbursing those schools solely for teachers' salaries.
71. 403 U.S. at 615.
72. 421 U.S. at 349 (1975).
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However, the Court found that the provision of "auxiliary services,"
including remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling
and testing services still involved excessive entanglement. 73 In the re-
vised scheme, the services were only to be provided by public school
personnel rather than by parochial school personnel. However, the
services were to be provided at the request of the private schools and on
their premises. While the Court found that the risk of a public school
teacher crossing the line from secular to sectarian teaching in remedial
subjects was slight, the risk remained because the services were to be
performed on private school premises and constant surveillance was
required to ensure that this did not happen.74 The Court considered
the question of political entanglement separately and found that there
were serious concerns about such entanglement. There was a real dan-
ger of repeated confrontations between the state and the parochial




The Lower Court Decisions
A Minnesota tax statute allowed state taxpayers, in computing
their state income tax liability, to deduct expenses incurred in provid-
ing tuition, textbooks and transportation for their children in elemen-
tary or secondary schools. 76 The deduction was available to all
taxpayers, whether the children attended public or nonpublic schools,
73. The auxiliary services included guidance, counseling and testing services; psychological
services; remedial and therapeutic services and "such other secular, neutral, non-ideological serv-
ices as are of benefit to nonpublic schools and are presently or hereafter provided for public school
children of the Commonwealth." Id. at 352-53 n.2. "Instructional materials" includes projection,
recording and laboratory equipment, maps, charts, globes, videotapes and filmstrips. The term
also included any materials provided to public school children. Id. at 354-55 n.4.
74. Id at 371-72. A similar scheme was upheld in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
However, in this case the counseling and therapeutic services were to be provided on neutral sites.
While noting the concern of the Meek Court that the pressure of the environment might cause an
employee to change his behavior from its normal course, the Wolman Court concluded the "super-
vision of public employees performing public functions on public property [does not create] an
excessive entanglement between church and state." Id at 248.
75. 421 U.S. at 372. The problem with the political entanglement inquiry, if based on the
need for annual appropriations, is that any program requires legislative action to be enacted.
While the amounts involved in many of the programs have been large, see supra note 68, the size
of the program should not matter. The concern should arise because of the nature of the program
and the constitutional issues raised. Even so, because the religion clauses of the first amendment
are implicated in these programs it is difficult to foresee any case in which the political entangle-
ment inquiry would not be present and significant. The inquiry, therefore, may not add anything
to the determination of the validity of the program.
76. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). For text of statute see supra note 11.
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and the amount of the deduction was limited to the lesser of the
amount spent or a statutory limit determined by the child's school
grade. Minnesota taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of the stat-
ute on the grounds that it violated the establishment clause by provid-
ing state aid to religious schools, thus involving the state in the affairs
of religion.
The district court upheld the statute,77 finding that the statute did
not have the primary effect of advancing religion. It found that the
statute was facially neutral and that because the benefit was indirect it
was permissible. 78 The statute, therefore, was closer to the permitted
tax exemptions in Walz than the so-called "tax deductions" in Nyquist.
The critical element was that the statute provided widely distributed
tax relief, available to all parents, irrespective of the schools attended
by their dependents.79 The court found that there was no excessive
entanglement as normal tax administration procedures do not give rise
to unconstitutional involvement in the affairs of religion.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed 80 the lower court, recognizing that its
decision to uphold the statute would create a conflict with the First
Circuit which had struck down an identical provision in Rhode Island
Federation of Teachers v. Norberg.8I However, because of the impor-
tance of the issue, the court felt it necessary to consider the constitu-
tionality of the different provisions and to disagree with Norberg.
Considering the different elements of the provision separately, the
court upheld the transportation deduction as similar to the reimburse-
77. 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981). The statute had been upheld in a prior district deci-
sion, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). However,
the prior decision was not binding as it was not a representative taxpayers' suit. The MCLU had
challenged the primary effect part of the test but had not produced any statistical evidence to
support their claim. In Mueller the taxpayers produced statistics from the Department of Revenue
attempting to show that the majority of the beneficiaries under the scheme were parents of chil-
dren in nonpublic schools. 514 F. Supp. at 1001-02. There was considerable dispute as to the
accuracy of the statistics at all levels of decision. The district court noted that the state produced
statistics showing that public school tuition expenses of $2 million were eligible for tax relief, that
these amounts were not included in the statistics and that the amounts for textbook and transpor-
tation expenses were not de minimis. Id. at 1002.
78. 514 F. Supp. at 1003.
79. Id. at 1002-3.
80. 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982).
81. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980). In Norberg, a Rhode Island scheme providing for tuition,
transportation and textbook aid was struck down. The statute provided for tax deductions for such
expenses incurred by parents up to a statutory maximum. This scheme was found to have the
primary effect of advancing religion because it conferred a special benefit on those parents choos-
ing to send their children to nonpublic schools. The court then used a statistical analysis to find
that the overwhelming majority of parents eligible for this deduction sent their children to sectar-
ian schools. Thus, it concluded, the benefit would result in nearly "solid sectarian lines." Id. at
860.
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ment of transportation expenses in Everson v. Board of Education.8 2
The benefit was available to all parents and the fact that the benefit was
through the tax system rather than direct reimbursement was consid-
ered unimportant. The court upheld the textbook provision as being
similar to Board of Education v. Allen.83 The provisions for "instruc-
tional materials and equipment" presented more problems, but the
court distinguished the cases which had struck down similar programs
by finding that the benefit was directed to the student and the parent
rather than the school.
84
The court considered that the constitutionality of the tuition de-
duction depended on whether Committee for Public Education and Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist 8 5 could be distinguished. The court in Norberg
decided that it could not and struck down the Rhode Island program.
86
The Mueller court, however, distinguished Nyquist on the grounds that
the statute in Nyquist operated as a tax credit and not a true tax deduc-
tion, and the tax benefits were limited to the narrow class of parents of
nonpublic schoolchildren, as opposed to the broad class of all parents
with children in both public and nonpublic schools in Minnesota.
87
The court stressed that the statute was neutral on its face and there was
sufficient evidence that the neutrality was not mere window dressing.
The court also analogized the deduction to charitable deductions under
Minnesota tax law and the diffused nature of the tax benefit. 88 The
court concluded that the tax policy was neutral toward religion by pro-
viding a tax benefit which is available to all taxpayers who incur de-
ductible expenses in sending their children to school.8 9
82. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
83. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
84. 676 F.2d at 1201-02. The instructional materials eligible for tax deduction were strictly
limited and included such items as the cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education,
rental fees for cameras, ice skates, calculators, musical instruments and pencils and special note-
books required for class. Id. at 1197.
85. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
86. Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F,2d 855, 861 (lst Cir. 1980).
87. 676 F.2d at 1203.
88. Id at 1205.
89. The Court of Appeals adopted the District Court's incorrect understanding of the Minne-
sota tax system. By reducing adjusted gross income taxpayers get a reduction in their tax liability
in proportion to the reduction. The system is not banded where tax is payable according to in-
come bands. In these systems a deduction would only provide a tax benefit if it was sufficient to
move the taxpayer to a lower tax band. See Comment, Mueller v. Allen. Do Tuition Tax Deduc-
tions Violate the Establishment Clause, 68 IowA L. REV. 539, 552-53 (1983).
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THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
Reasoning of the Court
Justice Rehnquist's majority decision began by recognizing the
difficulty which the Court has experienced in trying to interpret the
establishment clause because "we can only dimly perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional
law." 90 To illustrate the difficulty, the decision pointed out that al-
though some schemes have been consistently upheld, such as expenses
for transportation and textbook loans, other arrangements have been
struck down. In light of this confusion, Justice Rehnquist restated the
issue in the case as whether the Minnesota statute was closer to the
schemes approved in Everson and Allen or to that struck down in
Nyquist.91
The Court then reiterated the three-part test established in Lemon
and proceeded to apply it to the facts. Before starting, the Court re-
peated the caveat that the test is only a "signpost" and not determina-
tive.92 The Court found that the statute easily passed the secular
purpose test, although there was no explicit stated legislative purpose.
The Court reasoned that a desire for a well educated populace was
clearly a legitimate legislative concern and the Court was unwilling to
attribute unconstitutional motives to States when a secular interpreta-
tion of the statute was plausible. Furthermore, by encouraging private
schools the State was relieving itself of the burden of providing public
education for those pupils. Private schools may also be used as
benchmarks of excellence against which the performance of public
schools may be compared. 93
The Court then turned to the more difficult question of whether
the primary effect of the statute was to advance the sectarian aims of
the nonpublic schools. In deciding that this was not so, the court found
several features of Minnesota's program significant. First, it noted that
the deduction was essentially neutral because it was only one of the
many tax deductions permitted by Minnesota's tax laws. States have
considerable latitude in creating tax deductions because of their knowl-
edge of local conditions and this was not clearly outside Minnesota's
taxing power.
94
90. 103 S. Ct. at 3065 quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
91. Id. at 3066.
92. Id quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
93. Id. at 3067.
94. Id This point is unclear. The court of appeals suggested an analogy to charitable deduc-
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Second, the Court stressed that the deduction was available to par-
ents of children in both public and nonpublic schools. The Court
found that "the provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups
is an important index of secular effect." 95 Nyquist was, therefore, dis-
tinguishable because it provided benefits only to parents of nonpublic
schoolchildren. The Court concluded that the instant provision was
more like the programs in Everson and Allen which also benefited all
children because of the broad group benefited. Any establishment
clause objections were reduced because the aid went to the parents
rather than the schools. Although the Court acknowledged that to
whom the aid was directed was only one of many features to be consid-
ered, it assumed greater weight when all the recent cases invalidating
aid had involved direct grants to schools.
96
Concluding that the financial benefit to the nonpublic schools was
attenuated, the Court turned to a consideration of the evils against
which the establishment clause was intended to protect. The evil was
described as the kind of policy of government involvement in religious
life which is likely to lead to strife and to strain the political system.
97
The Court then warned that it is necessary to keep such matters in per-
spective and adopted Justice Powell's position in Wolman that the pres-
ent day is far removed from these dangers. The Court concluded that
"[t]he historic purposes of the clause simply do not encompass the sort
of attenuated financial benefit . . . at issue in this case."
'98
The Court then turned to the petitioners' claims. It rejected the
claim that, notwithstanding the facial neutrality of the statute, its appli-
cation primarily benefited religious institutions. The statistical data
produced to support this claim was described as "plainly mistaken" for
failing to take account of the deductions available to parents of public
school children.99 Furthermore, the Court refused to look beyond a
facially neutral law to determine its actual statistical application.
"Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field
stands in need of."0
tions to show that religious institutions derived considerable benefit from the tax system. 675 F.2d
at 1205.
95. 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
96. The Court recognized Nyquist as the only exception. Id. at 3069. However, parts of the
statute invalidated in Meek also involved loans to parents. See supra note 63.
97. Id quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. The petitioners had argued that the deductions for public school children were de mini-
mus. The Court dismissed this argument by noting that such parents could deduct summer school
tuition and various other tuition expenses. Id. at 3069-70.
100. Id. at 3070.
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The Court concluded its analysis of the primary effect by paying
tribute to private schools and noting their contribution to society. Any
unequal effect that might result from state aid through tax deductions
was more than outweighed by the contribution of private schools to
society.
In a brief overview of the excessive entanglement part of the test,
the majority had no difficulty in finding that the statute did not exces-
sively entangle the state in religion. The only potential involvement
was in deciding whether the books for which a deduction had been
claimed were devoid of sectarian content. Because this was similar to
the state involvement in Allen, which also required the state to ensure
that the books were suitable for use in public schools, it was found to
be permissible.
The Court dismissed the political divisiveness concern in a foot-
note. Noting that the test was first articulated in Lemon and that it had
been interpreted differently in subsequent cases, the Court concluded
that it should be confined to the facts of Lemon and would only apply
where direct financial subsidies were paid to parochial schools or teach-
ers in parochial schools.' 0
THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion 0 2 started with the premise
that a state may not support religious education either through direct
grants to schools or financial aid to parents and that financial aid to
parents is no more permissible if it is provided as tax credits rather than
cash payments.
The dissent examined the history of the principles underlying the
decisions relating to aid in parochial schools and noted that the reason
direct aid is prohibited is that it "necessarily results in aid to the sectar-
ian enterprise as a whole."' 0 3 Consequently, any aid which has been
permitted before has been restricted to the secular purposes of the
school. Services such as police and fire protection may be provided
101. The matter was dealt with in a footnote because it had been raised by amicus National
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, rather than by a party to the proceeding. Id. at 3071
n. 11. The Court's somewhat curious conclusion that the political entanglement test should be
confined to the facts of Lemon, arose becaue the Court considered that Lemon had distinguished
Everson and Allen and not found that this concern was present in those cases. This, however, was
not the case as the Lemon Court noted the concern of Justice Harlan in Allen that the potential for
political entanglement was present. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971). Even if the
concern was not present in Allen and Everson, it has been raised in several subsequent cases. See
supra note 68.
102. The dissent was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 3072-73. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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because this type of assistance is clearly separate from the religious
function of the school. If any aid cannot be guaranteed to be free from
sectarian influence, it should be denied. Indirect aid, therefore, is im-
permissible if it is not subject to restrictions which guarantee separation
from religious aims.
The majority's attempts to distinguish Nyquist were sharply criti-
cized. The dissent argued that tuition expense is the most significant
deduction and that this deduction was not available to most public
school parents because public education in Minnesota is free. Conse-
quently, the only parents who can benefit to any significant extent are
those with children in private schools. By providing tax relief to these
parents, the general taxpayer is paying part of the cost of such educa-
tion and providing an incentive to send children to parochial school. ' 0 4
The dissent stated that the only necessary inquiry for determining
primary effect of the statute is whether the deductions primarily benefit
private schools. If an examination of the statute on its face is insuffi-
cient, it is necessary to look at the actual operation of the statute.
When such an inquiry has been made, the majority of private schools
have been found to be sectarian. Minnesota is no exception as over
90% of the children enrolled in nonpublic schools are attending sectar-
ian schools. 0 5
The dissent also rejected the majority's reliance on the genuine tax
deduction nature of the tax scheme. Such a difference was considered
to be a "distinction without a difference" and not supported by prior
cases in which the Court had affirmed the striking down of both tax
deduction and tax credit schemes. 0 6 The majority's assertion that the
Minnesota scheme was more like the programs in Everson and Allen
than Nyquist was also considered to be incorrect. Allowances for tui-
tion are unlike indirect aid for transportation and textbooks as they
provide much more direct benefit to the school. As the indirect aid for
transportation approached the "verge" of constitutionality in Everson,
any more direct aid was clearly impermissible. Furthermore, even if
tuition aid was permissible it would still fail in this case because it was
not restricted to the secular purposes of the schools.
Turning to the other items which qualify for tax relief, such as the
cost of textbooks and other instructional materials, Justice Marshall
concluded that they were similarly unconstitutional. The problem,
104. The form of the aid is not controlling, the relevant inquiry is to the impact of the aid. Id
at 3073.
105. Id at 3075.
106. Id. at 3075-76.
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once again, was that the deductions were allowed to offset expenditures
which were not restricted to the secular side of school activities. The
direct result is that such aid leads to a benefit to the whole enterprise
and releases more funds for sectarian purposes. The textbook deduc-
tion can be distinguished from the textbook loan program in Allen as
the Minnesota program does not limit the textbooks to those texts that
can be used in public school.
0 7
ANALYSIS
In its reinterpretation of the establishment clause test stated in
Lemon, the Mueller Court has significantly altered the balance in favor
of state aid to religion and away from the constitutional concerns which
the test was designed to protect first. By finding that many of the con-
cerns of the framers are no longer a concern today, the Court is eroding
the very freedoms that the first amendment was intended to protect.
The revised test no longer guarantees that, at least with respect to state
aid to religious schools, the state will not be involved in religious af-
fairs. The state is now free to provide aid for the religious aims of
sectarian schools.
Historically, the Supreme Court's analysis has generally been in
terms of the concerns of the Lemon tripartite test, although the Court's
decisions in establishment clause cases have been far from consistent.
The test is concerned with traditional historical notions of the establish-
ment clause and a broader constitutional analysis. In Mueller, the test
has been modified by the Court. The importance of the constitutional
analysis has been downgraded and the historical concerns replaced by
a "benefit to society" analysis. '0 8 The change in the structure of the test
can be seen by considering each part of the test separately.
The secular purpose part of the Lemon test remains largely un-
changed. The statute must have a legitimate secular purpose to survive
scrutiny. However, the Mueller Court has broadened the permissible
secular purpose by indicating that it would find a more limited purpose
of ensuring the financial wellbeing of private schools to be accepta-
ble.109 The Court justified such a purpose by noting that the state is
relieved of a considerable educational burden by the existence of pri-
107. Id. at 3077. Minnesota already had a textbook loan program similar to that authorized in
Allen. MINN. STAT. §§ 123.932 and 123.933 (1980).
108. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
109. "Minnesota, like other states, could conclude that there is a strong public interest in as-
suring the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and non-sectarian." 103 S.
Ct. at 3067.
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vate schools. While such a purpose may seem acceptable on its face, a
large proportion of private schools are sectarian so that the Court is
effectively sanctioning aid to religious schools as a legitimate secular
purpose. Given the sectarian purposes of these schools this would be
directly contrary to prohibitions of state establishment of religion.
It is the primary effect part of the test which has been most signifi-
cantly altered in Mueller. By placing the greatest reliance on the facial
neutrality of the statute, 0 the Court is providing legislators with an
easy way to channel aid to private schools. As long as the statute ap-
parently provides aid to a wide group of persons, it will be acceptable,
even if the large majority of the beneficiaries are private sectarian
schools. The Court stated that to look beyond the statute would be to
ground constitutional analysis on statistics which could change from
year to year. While this would be valid if the statistics were in fact
likely to change significantly from year to year, the ratio of sectarian
schools to nonsectarian private schools is not subject to such change."lI
The facial neutrality analysis is the most arbitrary of the concerns
under the primary effect test. Some of the statutes presented to the
Court have involved aid to both public and private schools, while
others have provided aid to private schools alone." 2 In the latter case,
the statutes often have been direct counterparts of provisions for public
schools. While the Court has acknowledged that it is immaterial
whether the aid was made available to all schools through one statute
or two, it has only looked closely at the sectarian dominance of private
schools when aid was provided to private schools alone. 1 3 This has
enabled legislators to draft statutes widely thereby avoiding detailed
scrutiny of the effect of the statute on private schools. However, to be
consistent and more faithful to the concerns of the establishment
clause, the Court should subject the private schools to the same scru-
tiny regardless of the number of statutes used. Thus, the Court should
consider separately the effect of the statute on public and private
schools when only one statute is used. The reason why the statute is
110. Id. at 3068.
111. In cases where a statistical analysis has been employed the percentage of private schools
which were sectarian exceeded 75%. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 363. In New York, at
least, the proportion remained stable at 85% between 1973 and 1980. Compare Comm. for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973) with Brief for Appellants at 10,
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
112. Everson and Allen are examples of statutes addressed to all children while Meek, Wol-
man, Nyquisi and Lemon were directed only to private schools.
113. See supra note I11.
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under attack is because it extends aid to private schools, the majority of
which are sectarian, not because it supports public schools.
Another factor that the Court found significant under the primary
effect test is that the tax deduction is one of many under Minnesota's
tax laws." 4 While there is no dispute that state legislatures have broad
latitude in creating classifications in tax statutes, or that religious insti-
tutions may benefit from other deductions such as those for charity or
exemption from property tax, these factors do not make this deduction
acceptable. Clearly, state tax classifications are subject to the same
Constitutional scrutiny as any other activity, and the state could no
more authorize a tax deduction for an improper purpose than they
could pass laws permitting such an activity. Thus, although tax deduc-
tions may be a reasonable means of achieving stated ends, they do not
imply anything about the validity of the end or its effect in practice
and, therefore, add nothing to the analysis of the effect of the statute.
By giving prominence to such an argument, the Court succeeded in
obscuring the principal issue of whether the tax deduction was for a
legitimate secular purpose.
The third theme stressed by the Mueller Court is that the benefit
resulting to private schools is attenuated, and not one of the dangers
against which the establishment clause was designed to protect. 15 The
Court describes the benefit as attenuated because it is available to par-
ents rather than the schools, and to all parenls, rather than just the
parents of private schoolchildren. While providing the benefit to par-
ents rather than the school serves to make the aid less easily identifiable
as state aid to religion, 1 6 the benefit, as the Court recognizes, is
equivalent to giving the aid to the school.' 17 The dissent criticized the
majority's finding that the benefit was attenuated because such a posi-
tion was not being supported by prior decisions. Citing both Meek and
Wolman, the dissent pointed out that loans of wholly neutral secular
instructional materials had been prohibited because they contribute to
the schools' religious as well as secular teaching. 18
It is equally difficult to justify describing the benefit as attenuated
merely because it is an indirect benefit through the tax system rather
than a direct benefit to parents or the schools. The relationship be-
114. See supra text accompanying note 94.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
116. Professor Tribe suggests that the Court is trying to avoid any scheme which symbolically
identifies the aid with support for religion. Tribe supra note 16, at § 14-9 843-45.
117. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790-91.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 3077.
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tween tax deductions or credits and their subsequent effect on certain
types of expenditure is well known and understood. While tax deduc-
tions may be more acceptable than tax credits because they will never
fully reimburse parental expenditure, states should not be allowed to
do indirectly that which they could not do directly. If direct parental
reimbursement of tuition is unacceptable, tax deductions or credits for
the same purpose are equally impermissible.
After stating that the benefit is attenuated, the Court compares it
to the dangers which the establishment clause was designed to prevent.
These dangers are described as those types of government involvement
which tend to lead to strife and political strain."t 9 However, the Court
finds that these dangers should be kept in perspective; the opportunity
for modem sectarian control of the democratic processes is slight, and
may be tolerable in light of the benefits of private schools.' 20 The
Court recognized that the establishment clause goes beyond the estab-
lishment of a state church and prohibition of direct payments. How-
ever, the Court's conclusion that attenuated tax benefits are not
prohibited is stated without any attempt at justification. The position is
not supportable given the wider role of the tax system today. It would
seem that today's indirect tax aid is very much equivalent to direct le-
vies prior to the passage of the first amendment.' 2'
The fourth theme which the Mueller Court found persuasive was
that private schools play an important role in the education system by
removing from public rolls considerable numbers of children 22 and by
providing a possible yardstick of excellence against which other schools
can be measured. There is no doubt that if private schools were to
close, the public school system would be put under enormous strain to
accommodate the additional pupils. The Court then goes on to suggest
119. Id. at 3069. See supra note 68.
120. The fact that the breaches of the first amendment may be relatively minor has never
before been accepted as a defense. Once relatively minor violations are permitted, it is only a
question of time before major abuses occur. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 204,
225 (1963).
121. Many of the federal tax deductions and credits were adopted by Congress in order to
stimulate various expenditures or behaviors. For example, the investment credit was intended to
encourage the purchase of machinery and equipment and its rate has been changed to either speed
up or slow down business expenditure. Similarly, the charitable deduction was intended to stimu-
late philanthropy. It is Congress' belief that aid through the tax system is more effective than
direct expenditure which is why it is the preferred method of aid in many areas today. See, e.g.,
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: .4 Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) reprinted in W. Klein, POLICY ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 485 (1976).
122. There were approximately 91,000 students enrolled in Minnesota's 500 private schools in
1981. 103 S. Ct. at 3064.
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that the benefit of these schools to the community outweighs any bene-
fit they might receive from the state through the tax system.
This factor is clearly designed to reduce the significance of any aid
to religious schools. However, the implication of such a test is that the
constitutional concerns of the establishment clause are to be balanced
against the state's interest in preserving the private schools to relieve a
potential burden on the public school system and to provide a potential
benchmark of excellence. Such a balancing test, which is heavily
weighted in favor of the states and against the constitutional interest in
the establishment clause, is inappropriate. If such a test is adopted,
more factors will be added to the state's side and the state's interest will
always prevail. There is nothing about the balancing test which sug-
gests that it will be restricted to indirect aid packages, and, with the
shift towards greater accommodation of sectarian schools in the recent
cases, its reach is likely to be extended. Indeed, it was in a non-tax
direct aid case that the balancing test was first proposed by Justice
Powell. 123
Finally, the Court dismissed the excessive entanglement inquiry in
a few sentences. The Court found that the only possible entanglement
would arise from making a determination that no deduction had been
taken for instructional books and materials used for religious pur-
poses. 124 This inquiry was similar to that upheld in Allen, where the
textbooks had to be suitable for use in public schools, and the Court
found that there would be no excessive entanglement. In following Al-
len in this respect, the Court has impliedly re-adopted the premise that
the sectarian and secular functions of religious schools can be sepa-
rated. 125 This position was rejected by the Court in Meek and Wol-
man.126 The need for surveillance to ensure that no deduction is taken
for instructional books or materials used for sectarian purposes is
greater than the majority suggests. Minnesota already has a loan pro-
gram which provides textbooks used in public schools to nonpublic
schoolchildren, a point ignored by the majority. 27 Consequently, par-
ents are not likely to purchase books and materials available in public
schools, because these are available through the loan program. The
money spent, therefore, is much more likely to be spent on books and
materials with sectarian content.
123. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262-63 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
124. 103 S. Ct. at 3071.
125. 392 U.S. at 243-45.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
127. See supra note 107.
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By limiting its consideration of excessive entanglement,1 28 the
Court has abandoned the requirement that aid be restricted to the secu-
lar purposes of the school. This is a major change because it is the first
time that the Court has not restricted the aid to secular purposes. In
earlier cases, it was the need for surveillance to ensure that no aid was
being used for sectarian purposes that led to statutes being struck
down. 29 If aid is no longer to be restricted to secular activities in pri-
vate schools, the door would seem to be open for unlimited aid to sec-
tarian schools and an abandonment of the concerns of the
establishment clause.
CONCLUSION
After Mueller v. Allen, the potential for state aid to religious
schools has been greatly increased and the concern over the Constitu-
tional protections of the establishment clause has been greatly reduced.
The focus of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test has been significantly altered;
if a statute is facially neutral that is now sufficient to pass the primary
effect part of the test. That is effectively the end of the inquiry as the
requirement that aid be restricted to secular activities has been aban-
doned. By stressing the importance of private schools to society, the
Court has allowed the benefit to society test to overcome clear constitu-
tional prohibitions. The Mueller decision represents a dangerous disre-
gard for the protection of society afforded by the establishment clause
as a state is now free to aid religious activities at sectarian schools.
128. 103 S. Ct. at 3071.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.

